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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents are the record owners of the subject property
and appellants allege a security interest in the property.
This is an action for quiet title by respondents and
foreclosure of the alleged lien by appellants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court found appellants' interest in the
property was extinguished and appellants now have no interest
in the property.

Based on that finding, appellants

stipulated to entry of summary judgment in favor of
respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents ask this court to affirm the judgment entered
by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September, 1980, appellants

(American Coin) entered

into a Commodities Purchase Agreement with L. H. Investment
Company (R. 280-284).

Under the terms of the Commodities

Purchase Agreement, American Coin agreed to advance
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$"00,00.00, and L. H.

Investment was obligated to deliver to

Arner1can Coin, on October 22, 1980, the amount of gold, of a
specified quality, which could be purchased at 90.5% of the
London afternoon price that day, thus providing a return on
American Coin's investment of 9.5% per month or 114% per
annum.

(R. 280, paragraph C).

To secure performance of the Commodities Purchase
Agreement, L. H. Investment executed a promissory note to
American Coin in the sum of $200,000.00, which provided
additional interest at 18% per annum (the "Trust Deed Note")
(R. 271-273), and executed a Trust Deed covering the subject
property

(the "Trust Deed"), which provided it was for the

purpose of securing the $200,000.00 promissory note and
included a dragnet clause covering future advances.
275-278).

(R.

The Trust Deed Note provided:

This note is given as collateral security to
assure performance by the undersigned of their
obligations under that certain Commodities Purchase
Agreement, and this Note shall be deemed paid in
full upon strict performance by the undersigned of
their covenants and obligations under the terms of
the attached Commodities Purchase Agreement and this
Note shall thereupon be returned to the undersigned
and the Trust Deed secured hereby reconveyed and the
lien thereof released of record.
(R. 271, 2nd
paragraph).
On or about October 22, 1980, L. H. Investment requested
that it be allowed to repurchase the gold which it held ready
for delivery as required under the Commodities Purchase
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Agreement and American Coin agreed to sell the gold to L. H.
Investment.

(R. 286, paragraphs 1-3).

L. H.

Investment anc'

American Coin then entered into an Amendment to the
Commodities Purchase Agreement, under which the gold which L.
H. Investment held ready for delivery to American Coin was
sold by American Coin to L. H.

Investment.

(P. 286-287).

As

consideration for the right to repurchase the gold, L. H.
Investment paid American Coin $19,000.00 which represents the
9.5% discount and agreed to deliver to American Coin on
November 22, 1980, the amount of gold which could be
purchased for $200,000.00 at 90.5% of the London afternoon
price on that date.

(R. 286, paragraph 4).

Paragraph 6 of

the Amendment to the Commodities Purchase Agreement provided:
It is expressly agreed by the parties that this
contract is supplemental to the previous Agreement
of the parties, which is by this reference made a
part hereof, and the terms, conditions and
provisions thereof, unless specifically modified
herein, are to apply to this contract and are made a
part of this contract as though fully set forth
herein • • •
(R. 287).
On or about November 22, 1980, L. H. Investment again
held ready for delivery to American Coin the gold agreed to
be delivered on that date.
gold to L. H.

Again, American Coin resold the

Investment in consideration of L. H.

Investment's payment of $19,000.00 and agreement to deliver
to American Coin on December 22, 1980, the amount of gold
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.,111ch could be purchased at 90.5% of the London afternoon
price on that day.

(R. 293, paragraph D).

On or about December 8, 1980, L. H. Investment conveyed
the subject property to respondents (Jones) by Warranty
Deed.

The Warranty Deed recited that it was subject to the

Trust Deed given by L. H. Investment to American Coin to
secure the Commodities Purchase Agreement and $200,000.00
Note, but the obligations under the Agreement and Note were
not assumed by Jones.

(R. 19, paragraph 3).

Rather, L. H.

Investment remained obligated to perform under the Agreement
and Note.

At the time the Warranty Deed was delivered and

recorded, L. H. Investment's performance under the
Commodities Purchase Agreement, Note and Trust Deed was due
December 22, 1980.

(R. 293, paragraph H).

On or about December 22, 1980, American Coin again resold
to L. H.

Investment the gold which L. H. Investment then held

ready for delivery.

L. H. Investment again paid the 9.5%

discount and further agreed to deliver to American Coin on
January 22, 1981, the number of ounces of .999 fine gold that

$200,000.00 would purchase at 90.5% of the second London fix
price on that date.

(R. 293, paragraph 4).

On or about January 22, 1981, American Coin and L. H.
Investment entered into a new agreement entitled Revised
Commodities Purchase Agreement.
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(R. 293-301)

The new

Agreement, which provides it was to become effective Decemr,,
22, 1980,

(R. 301, paragraph 30), recites the prior deal inf],

and contracts between the parties and sets forth the same
scheme for the purchase and delivery of gold as in the
original Agreement.

(R. 293-294).

The new Agreement dated

January 22, 1981, however, includes a repurchase option,
entitling L. H.

Investment to repurchase the gold on each

delivery date in lieu of delivering the gold.

The new

Agreement, in contrast to the Amendment to the original
Agreement, also provides:
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement
among the parties pertaining to the subject matter
hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements and
understandings pertaining thereto.
No covenant,
representation, or condition not expressed in this
Agreement shall effect or be deemed to interpret,
change or restrict the express provisions hereof.
(R. 19, paragraph 19).
Consistent with the above quoted provision of the new
Agreement, a new Note dated January 22, 1981, in the
principal sum of $219,000.00 was executed by L. H. Investment
in favor of American Coin.

(R. 290-291).

In spite of the

fact that L. H. Investment had conveyed the subject property
to Jones on December 8, 1980, the new Agreement included
warranties by L. H.

Investment that it had the legal right

and ability to obtain title and possession to the subject
property and that it would provide American Coin an ALTA
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Lenders Title Insurance Policy insuring that
appellant had a first Trust Deed security interest in the
subject property.
L. H.

(R. 296, paragraph 9 (c}).

Investment performed under the new Agreement dated

January 22, 1981, until March or April, 1981, when it failed
to deliver the gold.

(R. 124, paragraph 5).

American Coin

then gave Notice of Default under the new Agreement and new
Note.

(Id.)

The present action was then commenced seeking a

judgment declaring that the new Agreement and new Note are
not secured by the subject property.
On April 8, 1982 American Coin's motion for summary
judgment was heard by the Trial Court.

At the hearing

American Coin admitted there were no disputed issues of facts
and that all facts necessary for a determination of American
Coin's interest in the property were before the Court.
504, 506).

(R.

The trial court, as requested by American Coin,

interpreted the writings between the parties and found
American Coin's lien on the property had been extinguished
and it had no interest in the property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
L. H. INVESTMENT STRICTLY PERFORMED ITS
COVENANTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
ORIGINAL COMMODITIES PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND
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TRUST DEED NOTE THEREBY TERMINATING
APPELLANTS' RIGHTS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Under Utah law, satisfaction or performance of an
agreement or obligation secured by collateral terminates, ,
a matter of law, the lien on the collateral.

In Aird

Insurance Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d 34'
(Utah, 1980), the Court held:
A pledge of security affords rights in the
pledgee only to the extent that the secured
obligaiton may become in default.
Moreover, the
nature of the obligation secured is a function of
the agreement between the parties • . •
Satisfaction of an obligation secured by a pledge
terminates, as a matter of law, the pledgee's rights
in the collateral.
Such termination is inherent in
the definition of a security interest • •
Consistent with the applicable law, under the express
terms of the Trust Deed Note executed in September 1980,
strict performance by L H Investment of its covenants and
obligations under the original Commodities Purchase
Agreement, a copy of which was attached to the Note,
constituted payment in full of the note and release of the
Trust Deed lien.

The note specifically recites it was givec

as collateral security to assure performance under the
Commodities Purchase Agreement and provides:
And this Note shall be deemed paid in full upon
strict performance by the undersigned of their
covenants and obligations under the terms of the
attached Commodity Purchase Agreement and this Note
shall thereupon be returned to the undersigned and
the Trust Deed secured hereby reconveyed and the
lien thereof released of record.
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Accordingly, the first issue raised is whether L. H.
Investment performed its obligations under the September,
1980 Commodities Purchase Agreement and Trust Deed Note.
The original Commodities Purchase Agreement was in effect
from September 1980 to December 22, 1980.

The new Revised

Commodities Purchase Agreement became effective December 22,
1980.

American Coin, by the recitals in the new Agreement,

acknowledged L. H. Investment held ready for delivery the
required amount of gold on each delivery date through
December 22, 1980.

In fact, American Coin has never claimed

a breach or default of the original Commodities Purchase
Agreement or Trust Deed Note and there is no dispute that L.
H. Investment strictly performed its obligations under the
first Agreement and Amendment thereto through December 22,
1980.

American Coin's argument is that the new Agreement was

merely an extension or modification of the first Agreement.
A.

Whether the Revised Commodities Purchase
Agreement dated January 22, 1981, was a new
agreement or merely an extension or
modification of the first agreement was
properly determined by the trial court
based on the written contracts and no
material issues of fact exist.

Appellants argument to this Court that questions of fact
exist as to the intent of the parties to the contracts is
without merit for two reasons:

First, American Coin

expressly represented to the trial court that both parties
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relied upon the terms of the written contracts to establish
the facts and specifically requested the court to rule on th•
issue based on its interpretation of the written contracts.
Its counsel urged the court as follows:
Ms. Heilbrun: The issue before the Court in this
matter is a simple single issue of law regarding the
validity and priority of a recorded Trust Deed owned
and held by my clients, American Coin Portfolios,
Inc. and Oakwood Manor • • • .
The Jones, as do we,
appear to rely on the terms of the writings between
the parties to establish the operative facts.
At
least in that we agree.
Our interpretation differs
obviously.
That's why we are here today.
This
Court can determine which interpretation is correct
from the express contracts and summary judgment can
be granted.
(R. 504, 506).
Having so urged the trial court, appellants are estopped from
now claiming the trial court erred because questions of fact
exist.

It is well-settled that:

The rule that a party will not be allowed to
maintain inconsistent position is applied in respect
to positions in judicial actions and proceedings.
As thus applied, it may be regarded not strictly as
a question of estoppel, but as a matter in the
nature of a positive rule of procedure based on
manifest justice and, to a greater or lesser degree,
on considerations of orderliness, regularity, and
expedition in litigation • • • • The rule against
inconsistent position applies generally to positions
assumed not only in the course of the same action or
proceeding, but also in proceedings supplemental
thereto, including proceedings for review or
retrial. • •
2B Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and
Waiver, S 69 at 696-697.
Second, while the intention of the parties may be a
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances
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tn

a

dispute between the parties to an agreement, when the

<lispute is between a party to the agreement and a third party
(not a party to the agreement),

the intent must be

determined solely from the express language of the document
itself.

James Weller,

Inc. v. Hansen, 517 P.2d 410 (Ariz.

App. 1973); Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833 (Ida. 1982);
Lepel v. Lepel, 456 P.2d 249

(Ida. 1969).

In James Weller, Inc. vs. Hansen, supra, Hansen and
Cherokee Construction Company (like American Coin and L. H.
Investment) were involved in several transactions pertaining
to the property involved.

Weller performed work on the

property and filed notice of a mechanic's lien, naming
Cherokee as the owner.

In the litigation, Hansen sought to

quiet title to the property and Weller sought to foreclose
its mechanic's lien.

Hansen claimed he did not receive the

required notice of the mechanic's lien.

Weller argued that

based on the contracts between Hansen and Cherokee, they were
joint venturers and therefore the notice to Cherokee was
sufficient.

Hansen argued there was a factual issue and the

relationship between him and Cherokee had to be based on
their intent and determined from all the relevant
circumstances.

The Court held:

While the intent of the contracting parties is
essential as between the parties, where there is a
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clear and unambiguous contract, as here, the
contract controls as to Weller, a third party.

*

*

*

The intent of the contracting parties to
form a partnership is always an essential element of
a partnership as between the partners themselves,
but as to third parties, the relation will be
determined from the facts rather than the
conclusions of the co-partners as to the nature of
the business relationship.
Id. at 1114-1115.
Jones was not privy to the contracts between American
Coin and L. H. Investment.

Therefore, whether the second

contract was a new agreement or merely a modification of the
first agreement must be determined from the express language
of the contracts, as urged by American Coin in the trial
court, and not from the conclusions of the parties to the
contracts, as now argued by American Coin.
B.

The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Written
Contracts was correct.

American Coin's contention that the new Agreement was
merely an extension or modification of the old Agreement is
untenable, particularly when the express terms of the new
Agreement are compared with the terms of the October 22, 198C
Amendment to the original Agreement.

When the original

Agreement was extended and amended in October 1982, the
Amendment provided:
It is expressly agreed by the parties that this
contract is supplemental to the previous agreement
of the parties, which is by this reference made a
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part hereof and the terms, conditions and provisions
thereof, unless specifically modified herein, are to
apply to this contract and are made a part of this
contract as though fully set forth herein.
In contrast, when the new Agreement was made in January,
1981, after strict performance of the old Agreement, it
provided:
This agreement constitutes the entire agreement
among the parties pertaining to the subject matter
hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements and
understandings pertaining thereto.
No covenant,
representation or condition not expressed in this
Agreement shall affect or be deemed to interpret,
change, or restrict the express provisions hereof.
(R. 19, paragraph 19).
In each case the contract language is clear and
unambiguous.

In October 1980 when the Commodities Purchase

Agreement was to be merely modified, it was done by
amendment, which expressly provided it was supplemental to
the original agreement,and incorporated all provisions of the
original agreement not expressly modified.
Also noteworthy is the fact that no new note was executed
to secure the Amendment.

In contrast, a completely new and

separate contract was prepared and signed by the parties in
January 1981.

The new contract recites full performance of

the original agreement and expressly provides it supersedes
all prior agreements.

Additionally, a new note securing the

new contract was prepared and signed.
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The new note is for a

different principal amount and does not by its terms purµort
to be a renewal or extension of the old note.
American Coin's reliance on First Security Bank of Uta!i
v. Proudfit Sporting Goods Co., 522 P.2d 123 (Utah 1976), is
misplaced.

In

Proudf it this Court held that the holder of a

security interest did not lose its priority as to an
intervening judgment creditor where the debtor obtained an
extension or renewal of a note to the holder of the security
interest.

The original obligation in that case was never

satisfied but was extended.

The Proudfit case would be

applicable to this case if L. H. Investment had not performej
under the original contract and had obtained an extension of
time in which to perform.
however, are that L. H.
original contract.
time for L. H.

The undisputed facts in this case,

Investment did perform under the

The new contract was not an extension of

Investment's performance, but, in fact,

recites full performance by L. H.

Investment under the first

contract and expressly provides it supersedes all prior
agreements.
In sum.mary, under applicable Utah law and by the express
provisions of the September 1980 Trust Deed Note, the Note
was deemed paid in full, and the trust deed lien terminated
when L. H.

Investment performed its obligations under the

September 1980 Commodities Purchase Agreement and the
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thereto.

The clear and unambiguous language of the

written contract supports the trial court's finding that the
Revised Commodities Purchase Agreement was a new contract and
not a mere extension of the earlier agreement.

L. H.

Investment did not have title to the subject property in
January 1981, when the new Agreement was made and therefore
could not give American Coin a security interest in the
property as it purported to do.
POINT II.
THE REVISED COMMODITIES PURCHASE AGREEMENT
AND TRUST DEED NOTE, DATED JANUARY 22,
1981, ARE NOT SECURED BY THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY UNDER THE SEPTEMBER, 1980, TRUST
DEED.
Since the obligations under the original Commodities
Purchase Agreement were fully performed and the original
Trust Deed Note thereby fully paid and American Coin's only
claim of default is under the new Agreement and new Note, its
claim to a security interest in the property under the
September 1980 Trust Deed is necessarily based on the future
advance provision of the Trust Deed, commonly known as a
"dragnet clause".

The dragnet clause provided that in

addition to the $200,000 promissory note, the Trust Deed
secured "the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Truster, or its successors or
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assigns, when evidenced by a Promissory Note or notes
reciting that they are secured by this trust deed."
Dragnet clauses such as this are not favored in equity
and are to be carefully scrutinized and strictly and narrowlJ
construed.

First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d

952 {Utah 1980); Osborn, Nelson

&

Finance Law, Section 12.8 (1979).

Whitman, Real Estate
In this case, the dragnet

provision does not extend the trust deed to the new
Commodities Purchase Agreement or new Trust Deed Note, dated
January 22, 1981, for three reasons:
A.

Once the Original Note Was Fully Paid and
Discharged, the Trust Deed Lien Was Extinguished and
Could Not Thereafter Secure Future Loans.

One rule quoted with approval by this Court in First
Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, supra, and applied by courts
in construing and limiting the application of dragnet
clauses, is stated by Osborn, Nelson & Whitman as follows:
Once the original debt has been fully
discharged, the mortgage is extinguished and cannot
secure future loan.
Id. at 774.
As discussed under Point I, there is no dispute that L.
H. Investment fully performed each and every obligations
under the original Commodities Purchase Agreement.

The

original Trust Deed Note, by its express terms, was deemed
paid in full upon L. H. Investments' performance of its
covenants and obligations under the original Commodities
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Purchase Agreement.

Accordingly, the lien created by the

September 1980 Trust Deed was extinguished.

The new

Agreement made in January, 1981, which by its terms
superseded all prior agreements and understandings between L.

H. Investment and American Coin, and the new Note signed at
that time, could not be secured by a lien which had been
extinguished.
B.

The Obligations Under the January 22, 1981,
Agreement and Note, which Appellants Claim Were
Breached, Were Incurred After the Property Was
Conveyed to Jones.

According to Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, supra, another
rule applied by courts in construing dragnet clauses is:

"If

the real estate is transferred by the mortgagor to a third
party, any debts which the original mortgagor incurs
thereafter are not secured by the mortgage.•

Id. at 775.

This rule was also quoted with approval by this Court in
First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, supra, and was adopted
by the drafters of the Uniform Land Transfer Act.
§

ULTA

3-205 (d).
The same rule was applied by the Texas courts in Vaughan

v. Crown Plumbing and Sewer Service, Inc., 523 S.W.2d 72 (Tx.
Ct. App. 1975), a case with facts strikingly similar to the
present case.

On May 13, 1974, Crown Plumbing purchased an

apartment complex from Gayne.

The sale was subject to
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several existing liens on the property, but the obligations
secured by said liens were not assumed by Crown.

One of tile

liens was created by a trust deed dated February 1, 1972, in
favor of Vaughan, which contained a clause purporting to
cover future advances.

On July 29, 1974 (after the sale to

Crown) Gayne signed another promissory note to Vaughan.
Gayne defaulted on this ooligation and Vaughan proceeded with
the requisite notices to conduct a trustee's sale, claiming
the July 29, 1974 note was secured by the February 1, 1972
trust deed.

Crown brought suit and obtained a TRO and

preliminary injunction enjoining the trustee's sale.

The

appellate court affirmed, holding that the February 1972
trust deed did not secure the obligation of Gayne to Vaughan
because it arose after Gayne transferred the property to
Crown.
In the present case, the only obligations which American
Coin claims were breached arose after L. H. Investment
conveyed the subject property to Jones.

Accordingly, these

obligations are not secured by the September 1980 Trust Deed.

c.

The Dragnet Clause in the September 1980 Trust Deed
Does Not Extend the Trust Deed Lien to the
Obligations Under the January 22, 1981 Agreement and
Note Because The Obligations Under the New AgreP.nent
Were Voluntary and Not Obligatory.

The general rule regarding priority between an original
lien holder who makes a future advance to the mortgagor and a
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•hird party who acquires an interest in the mortgaged
prnrerty after creation of the initial lien, but before the
future obligation is incurred by the mortgagor is that if the
future advance is voluntary rather than obligatory and the
mortgagee has notice of the intervening third-party's
interest, the interest of the third party takes priority.
Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, §12.7, supra.
This rule was applied by the trial court and affirmed by
this Court in Western Mortgage Loan Corporation v. Cottonwood
Construction Co., 424 P. 2d 437 (Utah 1967).

The following

analysis of this rule was suggested by the Court in First
Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, supra:
• • • In a case where there is no obligation to make
future advances, a mortgage, which purports to
secure future advances, cannot do so until such
advance has been made. Until such time, the
provision merely represents an expression of the
intention of the mortgagor and mortgagee that the
mortgage shall operate as a security for the
obligations of the mortgagor with respect to such
advances, if and when such obligation arises.
Thus,
these provisions, at most, represent an offer by the
mortgagor to provide the security of the mortgage
for such advances if and when they are made. • • •

_!!!. at 956.
In the present case

Coin had no obligation to

enter into the January 22, 1981 Agreement and Note.
acts were purely optional and voluntary.

Their

Jones' deed was

recorded December 8, 1980 and American Coin therefore had
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notice of it when it voluntarily entered into the new
Agreement.

As explained by the Court in Shiew, supra, the

dragnet clause represented merely an of fer by L. H.
Investment to secure future obligations with the September
1980 Trust Deed when they arose.
in January 1981, however, L. H.

When the obligations arose
Investment had already

conveyed the property to Jones.

Accordingly, the obligations

which arose at that time could not be secured by the subject
property under the 1980 Trust Deed.
In addition to the three legal grounds set forth above
supporting the ruling of the trial court, there is a basic
policy reason for not extending the September 1980 trust deed
lien to the obligations created under the January 1981
Agreement and Note.

Real property is commonly sold in this

state subject to existing trust deed liens.

In such

transactions, it is important that the buyer know exactly to
what liens his title is subordinate.

If dragnet clauses were

enforceable against third persons whose interests in the
property are known to the parties at the time the future
advance is made, the seller could create further encumbrances
on the property after selling it and the buyer would not know
the extent of the liens having priority.

In that case a

buyer may pay a substantial purchase price, but end up with
no equity in the property.

The existing practice in this

-20-

of buying property subject to a prior trust deed with a

·

dtagnet clause is obviously based on the assumption that the
existing lien cannot be increased or extended to other
obligations created by agreement between the mortgagor and
mortgagee after the sale.

A contrary rule would necessarily

and unfairly prejudice the buyer and make the prevailing
practice of selling property subject to a trust deed lien
totally impracticable.
POINT III.
THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION,
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION AND EQUITABLE
MORTGAGE ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT
CASE.
Appellants urge the Court to apply the doctrines of
equitable subrogation, equitable subordination and equitable
mortgage to the facts of the present case in order to prevail
on this appeal.
this case for the
A.

These doctrines are totally inapplicable to
reasons:

Equitable Subrogation.

Subrogation is the substitution of a person who satisfies
a claim or debt in place of the creditor so that he succeeds
to the rights of the creditor in relation to the debt or
claim.

Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Western Fire

Insurance Company, 597 P.2d 622, 629 (Kans. 1979).
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The law in Utah with respect to equitable subrogation wa
reviewed extensively in Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 11!9
(Utah 1936) where the Court recognized that there are two
kinds of subrogation, "legal" and "conventional".

Legal

subrogation, commonly referred to as equitable subrogation,
arises "where the person who pays the debt of another stands
in the situation of a surety or is compelled to pay to
protect his own right or property."

Id. at 114 (quoting

Bingham v. Walker Brothers Bankers, 75 Utah 149, 283 P. 1055
(1929).

Conventional subrogation "occurs where one is under

no obligation to make payment, and who has no right or
interest to protect, pays the debt of another."

Stated

simply, legal subrogation arises by operation of law, whereas
conventional subrogation arises from contract or the
agreement of the parties.

Hartford Fire Insurance Company v.

Western Fire Insurance Company, supra at 629.

State Farm

Mutual Assets Insurance Company v. Foundation Reserves
Insurance Company, 471 P.2d 737, 741 (N.M. 1967).

Equitable

subrogation is not applicable to the present case for the
following four reasons:
First, American Coin did not pay off a lien held by
another party.

The Trust Deed lien, originally held by

American Coin was extinguished by L. H. Investments'
performance and satisfaction of obligations under the
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.nrnndities Purchase Agreement.

(See Point I).

American

r_'oin's interest in the Note and Trust Deed were fully
extinguished at the time the second Agreement and second Note
were executed January 22, 1981.

Therefore,

Coin did

not pay the lien on the Subject Property and cannot be
subrogated to the prior lien.
Second, assuming, arguendo, that

Coin paid the

prior indebtedness, equitable subrogation cannot be applied
in the present case because American Coin would have paid its
own obligation and succeeded to its own rights as creditor.
Subrogation by definition contemplates "the substitution of
one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful
claim, demand or right,
Ed. at 1595.

Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th

There is no basis for the application of the

doctrine of equitable subrogation where the creditor is the
same person both before and after the debt had been paid.

A

common thread which runs through all cases dealing with
equitable subrogation is that the person who pays the
creditor is a separate and distinct person from that
creditor.

(See, generally, those cases cited in Martin v.

Hickenlooper, supra).
Third, even assuming, arguendo, that American Coin paid
the indebtedness, the circumstances of the present case do
not come within any recognized basis for subrogation.
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Legal

subrogation cannot be applicable to the present case becau 3 "
American Coin was neither a surety nor was it compelled to
make any payment to protect its interest.

A party is

compelled to make a payment to protect its interest in those
cases where it must do so or lose its interest such as where
it is a co-owner of the property.
Likewise, conventional subrogation is inapplicable.

The

Court in Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra at 1141, held
"[c]onventional subrogation occurs where one who is under no
obligation to make payment, and who has no right or interest
to protect, pays the debt of another • • • "

The Court

further held that in order to come within the principles of
conventional subrogation the lender had to be" • • • in no
way related to the property or in any way required to protect
an interest

"

Id. at 1151.

American Coin is not

entitled to the application of the doctrine of conventional
subrogation since it had a right or interest in the property
and was related to the property as the lien holder.
Fourth, equitable subrogation will be applied only "where
no innocent parties will suffer or no right has intervened."
Id. at 1142.

"Subrogation will not be permitted where it

will work any injustice to others."

Transamerica Insurance

company v. Bowes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783, 786 (1972) ·
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In the present case, Jones did not assume the obligations
of L.

H.

Investment, it took title to the property subject to

those obligations.

Jones reasonably expected that those

obligations would be satisfied by L. H. Investment, as they
in fact were.

To give American Coin a security interest in

the property by applying equitable subrogation would unduly
prejudice Jones' rights with respect to the property.
amount of prejudice is clear, $200,000.

The

l'lhen L. H.

Investment satisfied its obligations thereby extinguishing
the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, Jones' equity in the
property increased by $200,000.

This was in accord with

Jones' understanding that the obligations of L. H. Investment
would be satisfied on or before December 22, 1980.
B.

Equitable Subordination and Equitable Mortgage.

An equitable mortgage is created when one party advances
u?on the faith uf

by the debtor that he

will have a security interest in property of the debtor for
the satisfaction of his debt.

It is well-settled that the

equitable lien or mortgage takes effect at the time of the
transaction between the parties.

Garnett State Savings Bank

v. Tush, 657 P.2d 508 (Kans. 1983).

In Fitzgerald v.

F_itzgerald, 155 PP. 791 at Syl. 11 1 (Kans. 1916), the court
held that a lender becomes an equitable mortgagee of the
property from the time the agreement is made.
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While an equitable mortgage creates equitable interests
in the property, those interests are subject to prior liens.
Schmelzle v. Key, Inc., 452 P. 2d 41

(Colo. 1969).

Equitable

mortgages are also subject to prior known equitable
interests.

55 Am.Jur.2d, Mortgages § 10 at 200-201.

Therefore, even if the doctrine of equitable subordination
and equitable mortgage were applicable in the present case,
American Coin's interest in the Subject Property vested at
the earliest on January 22, 1981 when the 1981 Revised
Agreement and Note were executed.

All legal and known

equitable interests existing prior to that date would have
priority over the interest of American Coin.
In their brief, American Coin refers to 55 Am. Jur.2d
Mortgages § 332 at 399 for the proposition that an equitable
mortgage "is effective not only against the parties thereto,
but also against others who secure their interests with
knowledge of the rights of mortgagee."
at p. 22).

(Brief of appellant

The quotation from which the above-recited

reference was taken is as follows:
A mortgage which is operative to transfer an
interest in the mortgaged property to the mortgagee
in equity only is effective, like other equities,
not only against the parties thereto, but also
against others who secure their interests in the
property as volunteers or with notice of the rights
of the prior mortgagee.
55 Am. Jur.2d Mortgages§ 332 at 399 (emphasis supplied).
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It is apparent that the above-quoted provision is
applicable only to those who secure their interest in the
property with notice of a prior equitable mortgage.
American Coin's equitable mortgage could not have been
prior to the Jones' interest.

Jones recorded their deed to

the Subject Property on December 8, 1980.

The equitable

mortgage claimed by American Coin could not have been created
until January 22, 1981.

Jones could not have had notice of

American Coin's equitable mortgage until nearly a month and
one half after their deed had been delivered to them.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling was proper and should be
affirmed for the following reasons:
1.

The obligations and covenants under the original

Commodities Purchase Agreement were strictly and fully
performed by L. H.

Investment.

Strict Performance of those

obligations constituted payment in full of the obligation.
2.

The obligations under the new Agreement and Note

dated January 22, 1981, could not be secured by the September
1980 trust deed because:

(a) the trust deed lien was

extinguished before the new obligations arose,

(bl

they were

incurred after the property had been conveyed to Jones,
lhe obligations under the new Agreement and Note were
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(c)

voluntary and not obligatory, and

(d) a contrary ruling

be inconsistent with the prevailing practice of selling real
property in this state subject to trust deed liens.
3.

The doctrines of equitable subrogation, equitable

subordination and equitable mortgage are not applicable in
the present case and cannot provide American Coin a security
interest in the Subject Property prior to that of Jones.
DATED this 29th day of July, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

4- (J,_£(

oavidG:wrrfams

Attorneys for Respondents
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